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Abstract
We study the art market in the XVI-XVIII centuries with an econometric analysis of a new
dataset on original contracts between patrons and artists for commissions of oil paintings of historical
subject in the Venetian Republic. Size of paintings, reputation of the painters as perceived at the
time, type of commissions and aggregate demand shocks (the plague) a⁄ect prices as expected. We
￿nd evidence of contractual solutions to moral hazard problems: since quality was not contractable,
prices were made conditional on measurable features correlated with quality as the number of human
￿gures. We also ￿nd strong evidence of price equalization between high-demand and low-demand
towns due to painters￿ mobility. Finally, we provide support for the Galenson hypothesis of a positive
relation between age of experimental artists and quality as priced by the market. The results are
con￿rmed for other Italian art centres.
1Universit￿ degli Studi di Milano, Bicocca - Piazza dell￿ Ateneo Nuovo 1, Milan, 20126, U6. We are thankful
to Silvia Marchesi, Luca Mocarelli, Paolo Tedeschi, Valerio Varini and especially Vanessa Marcandella and
Piergiovanna Natale for helpful discussions. The Gabinetto di Numismatica of the Sforza Castle of Milan
provided valuable help on monetary issues. Reproduction of Figure 1: Courtesy of the Louvre Museum.
E-mail addresses: federico.etro@unimib.it and laura.pagani@unimib.it.
11 Introduction
Art objects are often perceived, and sometimes de￿ned, as handmade works that are valuable
independently of their objective features (i.e.: their material composition or other quanti￿able
aspects) and as the fruit of pure talent and inspiration independently from monetary and
contractual incentives. This is more so for artworks by old masters, and possibly even more
for religious or historical paintings by geniuses as Titian, Tintoretto or Caravaggio. At the
same time, the pricing of a unique art object is often perceived as highly subjective and largely
dependent on the tastes, wealth and prestige of buyers, with little regard for factors a⁄ecting
demand and supply, especially when one is thinking of the Renaissance and Baroque periods,
in which honour and prestige were claimed to be the drivers of social and economic activities
(of patrons and artists) more than the pro￿t-seeking behavior of the homo economicus. The
purpose of this paper is to show that these perceptions are misleading.
A look at the prices of famous old paintings may even reinforce the impression that little
can be rationalized in the market for paintings in the XVI-XVIII centuries. The Wedding at
Cana by Veronese (Figure 1) was commissioned for a wall of the nave f the Venetian church
of S. Giorgio Maggiore in 1563 for 324 silver ducats. It is, and was at the time, considered
a masterpiece for its imposing composition, the splendid contemporary costumes, and the
luminous colors, probably not because of its size (about 70 square meters) or for the number
of ￿gures depicted (more than a ￿fty). Today we ￿nd it at the Louvre Museum, right in front
of another painting whose size is much smaller, but whose value is hardly so: the portrait of
a single human ￿gure, the Monna Lisa by Leonardo. Less known than the original painting
by Veronese are its copies: one by the minor painter Antonio Zanchi for a private collection
was paid 1000 ducats in 1671, more than the double of the original, even taking in￿ ation into
account!2 Another of the three great masters of the XVI century in Venice, Tintoretto, had
a long and brilliant career, but he never managed to be paid as much as the rival Titian for
his works. Only in 1583, at the age of 65, Tintoretto reached his highest fee (400 ducats) for
a Nativity commissioned for the Escorial building by the king Philip II of Spain: apparently,
Tintoretto did not put much e⁄ort in this work, since his son Domenico painted most of
it. At the turn of the century, the fees for the revolutionary paintings by Caravaggio were
extremely low, and also without any growing trend. Meanwhile, the more fashionable Guido
2We remind the reader that all the paintings mentioned in anecdotical references and reproduced in the
pictures are paintings from our dataset.
2Reni was starting a successfull career that would have made him the best paid painter of
the century in Italy. One of his last altarpieces, the Adoration of the Shepherds (1640-42)
for the Certosa of S. Martino in Naples (Figure 2), was paid the equivalent of more than
3000 ducats: each ￿gure depicted cost more than an average altarpiece by ordinary painters,
including Caravaggio (whose fame came only centuries later). In 1625, an art dealer who was
contracting an altarpiece by Cerano in Milan told the patron that the painter would have
probably accepted 250 ducats, but also that if Cerano were to go to Rome he would be paid
500: because, he added, Rome is ￿where you go to get rich￿ .
All this may leave much confusion on the pricing of paintings and some questions: what
was determining the price of these paintings? did size matter? did the number of ￿g-
ures a⁄ect prices and why? what was the premium for quality? was there a life cycle of
painters￿ earnings? was the demand of wealthy patrons and richest cities going to increase
the average prices? The purpose of this article is to show that looking at the market for
paintings as a fully ￿ edged market and analyzing the contractual aspects of its deals and the
endogeneity of its structure can shed light on some of these questions.
Analyzing a new dataset on original contracts between commissioners and painters based
on the recent monumental art historical research by Spear and Sohm (2010)3 we study econo-
metrically a number of theoretical implications. We focus on commissions for large oil paint-
ings of historical (religious or mythological) subject produced in Venice and Veneto in the
period 1551-1746 and we investigate the relation between the price of paintings, adjusted for
the cost of life, and a number of variables characterizing the same paintings, the painters,
the commissioners and the macroeconomic context. We also con￿rm our results on a more
limited dataset concerning the other main Italian art centers (Rome, Florence, Bologna and
Naples) for the entire XVII century.
The equilibrium prices can be interpreted in terms of hedonic prices re￿ ecting the expected
aesthetic value of paintings - see Rosen (1974) for the theory and Combris, Lecocq and
Visser (1997) for a recent empirical application to wines￿prices. In our case, paintings￿prices
should depend on the reputation of painters as perceived at the time, which we capture by
artists￿￿xed e⁄ects and through a quality index based on documentary evidence about the
average income of painters. Beyond this, a number of supply and demand factors a⁄ect the
3The work includes chapters by Richard Spear on Rome, Philip Sohm on Venice, Christopher Marshall
on Naples, Ra⁄aella Morselli on Bologna, Elena Fumagalli on Florence, Renata Ago on the economic history
approach and Richard Goldthwaite on the painting industry in early modern Italy.
3Figure 1: Veronese, 1562, Wedding at Cana, currently at the Louvre Museum, Paris
4equilibrium prices as expected. For instance, a positive and concave relation between prices
and size of paintings re￿ ects economies of scale in the production of paintings. Other relevant
explanatory variables include the placement of the paintings in the church (on the altar, on
the ceiling or on the walls) or in a public or private building.
More interestingly, we ￿nd evidence of contractual solutions to moral hazard problems
between patrons (principals) and artists (agents). Large commissions for oil paintings of
historical subject required months or years of work and generated con￿ icts of interest for
the simple reason that quality was observable ex post but not contractable ex ante (one
of the ￿rst works to emphasize contract theory issues in art history matters is Nelson and
Zeckhauser, 2008, which however focuses on signalling aspects). We support the idea that
patrons and artists adopted a a typical solution to the moral hazard problem pointed out
in the standard principal-agent literature (Holmstrom, 1979): prices were made conditional
on measurable features of the paintings which were positively correlated with quality, one of
which was the number of human ￿gures in the composition.
Moving from microeconomic aspects to macroeconomic ones, we evaluate the impact of
local (temporary) demand shocks and aggregate demand shocks. Di⁄erences in local demand
could be detected when looking at di⁄erent cities: demand was higher in big cities as Venice
or Rome than in small provincial towns in the countryside. However, the mobility of painters
was high, therefore we should expect that price di⁄erentials between high-demand and low-
demand towns should be arbitraged away. Indeed, we ￿nd that prices in the periphery
were lower than in center, but, after controlling for paintings￿and painters￿features, these
di⁄erences disappear. This suggests that the structure of the market (the number of painters
and the equilibrium prices) was endogenous and the opportunities for extra pro￿ts were
eliminated through the mobility of painters:4 Venice in Veneto or Rome in Italy were not
paying more their painters (as often thought because of higher demand), but they were just
attracting the best quality painters for more ambitious commissions. In other words, market
forces were clearly at work to induce price equalization in a largely integrated market. On
the other side, aggregate demand shocks exerted direct e⁄ects on prices. As an example, we
study the impact of the plague, which hit Venice and all the surrounding regions in 1630,
and we verify that its impact was to reduce prices in a signi￿cant way. The same happened
in Central Italy with the plague of 1656.
4On the theory of endogenous market structures in general equilibrium see Etro (2009).
5Figure 2: Guido Reni, 1640-42, Adoration of the Shepherds, Certosa of S. Martino, Naples
6Finally, we provide novel support for the Galenson (2006) hypothesis for which experi-
mental innovators (exempli￿ed by artists as Titian or Tintoretto) increase the quality of their
work (as priced by the market) while aging and improving their techniques by experience,
while conceptual innovators (exempli￿ed by Caravaggio) do not exibit a positive correlation
between quality and age.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some related literature. Section 3
describes the market and derives a number of theoretical implications. Section 4 presents
the dataset. Section 5 presents the econometric investigation and the results for the analysis
of Venetian data. Section 6 extends it to other major Italian art centres (Rome, Florence,
Bologna and Naples). Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
As far as we know, this is the ￿rst work to test econometrically theoretical predictions for
the art market on data from original contracts between artists and their patrons, however
our analysis is at least related to three strands of literature on the relation between art and
economics. The ￿rst analyses the impact of economic factors on the art market. There is a
long tradition in art history studies regarding the relation between social and artistic devel-
opments, as in the marxist approach of the social history of art (Hauser, 1951). Recently,
economists as De Marchi (1995) and Monthias (2002) and economic historians as North
(1999) have emphasised the importance of economic incentives in shaping the Dutch golden
age of the art market, the ￿ 600s. O￿ Malley (2005) and Nelson and Zeckhauser (2008) have
provided the ￿rst systematic studies of the art contracts during Italian Renaissance, focusing
respectively on the contracts for altarpieces stipulated between painters and patrons in the
period 1300-1600 and on more general signalling and reputational mechanisms in the con-
tractual relations of the same period. In the same spirit of the ￿rst work, Spear and Sohm
(2010) have extended the analysis of contracts to the subsequent Baroque period (widely
de￿ned as including the late Mannerism of the end of the XVI century and the Rococ￿ of
the early XVIII century), deriving an interesting analysis of the economic lives and incomes
of the painters.5 However, the key contribution of these works is data collection because
they provide a ￿ne descriptive analysis of the market for oil paintings in those periods, but
they do not carry out econometric investigations of the collected data. The only multivari-
5See also the articles in Fantoni, Matthew and Metthews-Grieco (2003).
7ate analysis of Renaissance and Baroque artworks￿prices we are aware of is by GØrin-Jean
(2003), who investigates the determinants of the prices of heterogeneous artworks, including
statues, decorative objects and also paintings of any subject, from inventories (and not orig-
inal contracts) of the Medici period, mainly with predictive and ranking purposes. However,
the procedure used for converting prices, originally expressed in twenty di⁄erent currencies,
into a unique currency seems inaccurate.6 Moreover, the work does not investigate at all the
economic factors behind the empirical ￿ndings.
The second strand of literature related to our paper studies art prices derived from con-
temporary auctions. Starting from the classic paper by Baumol (1986), part of this liter-
ature is aimed at estimating the return from investment in art (see among others Buelens
and Ginsburgh, 1993; Agnello and Pierce, 1996; Locatelli-Bley and Zanola, 1999; Mei and
Moses, 2003). Another part of this literature analyses the determinants of art prices. For
instance, Hellmanzik (2010) estimates the role of location (Paris versus New York) for prices
of modern visual artists born between 1850 and 1945. Onofri (2009) studies the impact of a
particular Italian regulation, the export veto on old masters paintings, on the price di⁄eren-
tial between pre-auction estimated price and post-auction hammer price. Our study di⁄ers
deeply from these works because we consider artworks￿past values, that is prices originally
bargained between painters and commissioners. This is a very valuable feature of our dataset
because it allows us to study the price structure in a primary market completely di⁄erent
from the secondary (auction) market. Only by studying the process of original prices forma-
tion it is possible to detect the role of economically crucial factors like contractual aspects or
competition between painters.
The third relevant literature was started with the works of Galenson (2000, 2006) on the
relation between age and artistic innovations. Most of the econometric evidence in support
of the Galenson hypothesis relative to the di⁄erent age pro￿les of quality production for
experimental and conceptual innovators is based on data from contemporary auctions for
modern art (Galenson and Weinberg, 2000; Hellmanzik, 2010). Our study allows us to
evaluate the Galenson hypothesis for old master painters looking at the relation between
their age and the aesthetic value of their work as perceived and priced at their time.
6GØrin-Jean (2003) converts all prices of Italian artworks in Sterling Pounds of the year 1680 (without
references for this procedure) and adjusts for in￿ation using an index computed for Southern England. See
Guerzoni (2010, p. 23) for a critical assessment of this work.
83 The Market for Oil Paintings
During Renaissance a large part of the accumulating wealth of the Italian urban centers
was channelled toward demand for durable goods with artistic content, from architecture
(including building palaces, villas, churches, private chapels,..) to sculpture and any decora-
tive element of the liturgical apparatus including, of course, altarpieces and other paintings
(Goldthwaite, 1993). The peak of this process was reached in the Baroque period, with its
churches and chapels ￿lled with the richest and most extravagant decorations and paintings
on the altars and on the entire space of walls and even ceilings. This early form of ￿con-
sumerism￿spread to public and private buildings developing a wide market for luxury goods,
in which paintings of di⁄erent kinds were playing a prominent role.
By the ￿ 600s, the market for paintings was characterized by a wide product di⁄erentia-
tion.7 While most paintings from the previous centuries were of historical (mainly religious
or mythological) subject, the raising demand from private buyers induced the production of
new subjects (as landscapes, genre paintings, still lifes,...) and even of further specialization
within subjects (as still lifes of ￿ owers, fruits, animals, ￿sh, trompe-l￿ oeil,..), so as to establish
a deep horizontal di⁄erentiation. Most painters were specialized in one of these submarkets,
whose prestige and monetary compensations were clearly ranked, with still lifes at the bot-
tom, genre paintings, landscapes and portraits in increasing value, and historical paintings at
the top. Only few painters were perceived as good enough to specialize in historical paintings,
whose more ambitious compositions could include many interacting ￿gures depending on the
ability of the painter at representing a particular subject (or plot) with complex relations
between the protagonists and the marginal players - think of an Adoration of the Shepherds
or stories from the Bible or even from the life of (almost) contemporary saints. Historical
paintings could involve two di⁄erent techniques: frescoes required a specialized and rapid
method and were regarded as imperfect substitutes for oil paintings,8 which represented
the majority of large commissions for churches, chapels, council chambers, confraternities￿
boardrooms and also rooms in private palaces, mainly in the form of altarpieces.
7See Wittkower (1958) for a classic introduction to Baroque art history.
8Especially in Venice frescoes were rare because humidity could easily damage them. In Central Italy they
were more common and their price/size ratio was typically lower. However, their large (and often hardly
measurable) size makes it hard to compare them properly with oil paintings. For this reason, and for the
clear segmentation of these markets, our analysis will focus on oil paintings.
93.1 Market de￿nition and market structure
Altarpieces had a long standing tradition in the previous centuries. Between the XIII and
XVI century di⁄erent kinds of altarpieces coexisted, with at one extreme polyptychs on wood
panels with multiple surfaces painted with expensive colours (e.g.: gold and ultramarine blu)
and surrounded by expensive carved and gilded frames (often provided by the artists as well),9
and at the other extreme simple rectangular canvases prepared without golden backgrounds
and frames.10 By the mid XVI century and for the following two centuries, the second
typology of altarpieces, and its minor variations for wall and ceiling decorations, became a
rather common product whose market is the subject of this study.11
The market for oil paintings of historical subject was characterized by competition in
prices between di⁄erentiated products with endogenous entry of producers. In the main art
centres, as Venice, Rome or Florence, local artists were organized in guilds or academies and
had to pay an entry fee to access the guild, create their own bottega (workshop), employ
assistants and trade their paintings under common rules. However, these guilds were not
e⁄ective at protecting rents. First of all, many low quality painters were able to avoid
enrollment and practice the art without following the basic rules decided by the guild.12
Second, competition was strong and sometimes even predatory, with painters undercutting
each other, adopting di⁄erent forms of price discrimination,13 and heavily advertising their
9The cost of the woodwork for these polyptychs was quite high and typically born by the painters. O￿ Malley
(2005) estimates it between 15 % and 30 % of the total price. Another 30 % was also spent for gold leafs and
gilding. For this reason the price of early altarpieces could be quite di⁄erent from the net revenue of painters.
This makes it convenient to focus on later altarpieces whose preparation did not include these costs.
10In Rome at the beginning of the ￿ 600s, ultramarine blue (obtained from the mineral lapis lazuli, imported
from Afghanistan) could cost about a hundred times the cost of other colours, but patrons customarily paid
for it (Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 66). Patrons often covered also the costs for canvases, stretchers and
priming.
11Also the painting technique changed over time. Initially tempera was used. During the second half of
the XV century oil colours were imported from Flanders, ￿rst in Venice and then everywhere else. By the
XVI century, oil colours were almost universally used.
12For instance, in 1596, the Venetian guild sued two minor painters, Giovanni Contarini and Pietro Mal-
ombra for refusing to join the association. They defended themselves claiming that they were only occasional
painters practicing painting for delight and not for money. The guild rebutted this showing proofs of pay-
ment and the court punished them. Contarini joined the guild in 1597, but Malombra kept painting without
enrolling in the guild for other twenty years (see Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 212-213).
13Painters often adopted quantity discounts to obtain multiple commissions. There is also evidence of
di⁄erent quality levels made available for di⁄erent prices. Luca Giordano said he could paint with three
10works. Tintoretto was an aggressive leader in the market, repeatedly using discounts and
preemptive gifts to conquer commissions.14 He also kept exibiting his works on the street
against the rules of his guild. Salvator Rosa used prints to show and advertise his future
paintings. Lotto and Renieri sold multiple paintings in lotteries. Of course, the painters were
also engaged in vertical di⁄erentiation, with the best artists and the (stylistic) innovators able
to obtain the best commissions, and the least successful artists representing a competitive
fringe of entrants for minor commissions.
E⁄ective mobility across Italy was extremely high in this market, not only because Ital-
ian and foreign artists could easily travel between the main art centres,15 but also because
painters could receive commissions from distant locations, paint in their own workshop, and
send the ￿nished products to the ￿nal destination, especially when canvases replaced heavy
panels. Transport costs were low, though import tari⁄s existed between di⁄erent countries.
Commissioners were open to deal with painters from any provenance as long as they had a
good reputation, therefore one can think of our market as a highly integrated market.
Large oil paintings required months of work and sometimes even years (though artists
were used to work contemporaneously on multiple commissions and on other minor paint-
ings). Most commissions were formalized in detailed contracts signed in front of notaries
with validity throughout Italy, and de￿ning the price and the mutual responsibilities of the
principal (the patron) and the agent (the artist). Early contracts did not require the painter
to directly paint the altarpiece: subcontracting was allowed (though rare) except in the pres-
ence of Sua mano (his own ￿hand￿ ) clauses (see O￿ Malley, 2005, p. 3). In the more advanced
period under our consideration, however, the value of artistic personalities and signatures be-
came more important and all commissions were directly undertaken by the painter, at most
brushes for di⁄erent prices: a gold brush, a silver one and a bronze one (not by chance, he was called Luca
fa￿presto, literally "Luca does it quickly").
14In 1564 the Scuola di San Rocco asked a few painters to submit drawings for a ceiling painting. Tintoretto
circumvented the competition (of Veronese, Zuccaro and Salviati) installing as a gift a quickly ￿nished painting
during the night before adjudication and, with this, he conquered a multi-decade monopolistic position in the
decoration of the boardroom, chapter hall and meeting hall of the Scuola. Nevertheless, his prices remained
low, as a sign of the competitive entry pressure that was still present. See Etro (2006) for an economic theory
of aggressive leadership in front of entry pressure.
15Venice had a long tradition for receiving foreign artists (at least since the arrival of Durer), and Rome
started attracting painters at least since the return of the Pope in the 1420￿ s. During the XVII century Venice
imported many foreign artists (as Loth, Strozzi, Heintz) and also temporarily exported others (as Ricci or
Pellegrini), while Rome was the leading international centre for artists from all Europe.
11with the help of assistants for background and decorative details, including architectural
settings and still lifes.
Of course, these principal-agent contracts were largely incomplete, because the main
issue, the quality of the paintings, could be observed, but it could not be de￿ned ex ante
and veri￿ed ex post (see also Nelson and Zeckhauser, 2008). Painters did care about their
reputation, however this could set a lower bound on their e⁄ort, but could not provide the
incentives to guarantee the quality levels that di⁄erent patrons were looking for. To limit this
moral hazard problem, a few contractual solutions were adopted. First of all, many contracts
required preliminary drawings to be evaluated and possibly approved by the commissioners.
Second, ex post rejection of the painting in case of low quality was a credible threat for the
artists, but could only insure a minimum level of e⁄ort.16 Third, contracts occasionally left
space for bonuses for quality between 10 % and 20 % (O￿ Malley, 2005, p. 125): judgement
was sometimes by the commissioners and other times by external painters, inducing con￿ icts
of interests in both cases. The last practice may be seen as a sort of incentive contract, but
its e⁄ectiveness appears to have been quite limited. However, as we will see, the Baroque age
developed alternative incentive mechanisms, associated with quanti￿able variables correlated
with quality, in the spirit of the standard principles of the principal-agent theory (Holmstrom,
1979).
The demand for oil paintings of religious subjects derived mainly from new churches, to
decorate their main altar and the lateral chapels (most of which were private and, therefore,
under the budget of wealthy patrons) or their naves￿walls and ceilings, and from old churches
replacing ruined (or stylistically out of fashion) paintings. Moreover, demand derived also
from public buildings (such as Palazzo Ducale in Venice or Palazzo della Podest￿ in Padua)
and private collections (as the one of Stefano Conti in Venice in the mid XVII century) with
similar needs extended also to mythological subjects. Richer cities, where more churches
were built, more prestigious buildings existed and wealthier patrons were active, were clearly
demanding more and higher quality paintings.
The supply of paintings was depending on the number of painters of di⁄erent quality
available and on their productivity. It is reasonable to expect that the supply of low quality
painters was rather elastic, while that of high quality painters was constrained by the avail-
16Many altarpieces by Caravaggio were rejected (but other private buyers immediately bought them).
Partial revisions of the contracts were also possible, but penalties for delays and price renegotiations were
rare.
12ability of innovative talents in the Italian market and therefore was more rigid, at least in the
short and medium run. Moreover, we can expect that productivity could increase with age,
at least for painters that kept innovating and experimenting new methods and styles during
their careers (Galenson and Jensen, 2001).
The equilibrium of the market for oil paintings can be interpreted in terms of hedonic
prices re￿ ecting the expected aesthetic values of paintings (Rosen, 1974), or at least the per-
ceived reputation of the painters in producing works of quality. However, the impossibility
of writing contracts contingent on the quality of paintings suggests that other quanti￿able
variables correlated with cost, e⁄ort and quality should a⁄ect prices. The equilibrium struc-
ture of the market can be regarded as endogenous, with the number of painters active in each
art centre determined by the pro￿table opportunities available locally and, given the high
mobility, also in the other towns.
3.2 The determinants of art prices
In the rest of this section, we discuss one by one the main variables a⁄ecting prices on the
basis of economic considerations. These variables will generate the main predictions to be
tested in the empirical analysis.
3.2.1 Aesthetic value
There is no doubt that the aesthetic value of a painting as perceived by the contemporary
audience should be the ￿rst determinant of its price. However, in a primary market prices
are established before the paintings are done and quality cannot be measured in an objective
way. Therefore, prices can only depend on the expected quality and its determinants. The
main one is the reputation of the painter for producing works of quality. Each painter can
be seen as characterized by a speci￿c style more or less appreciated and priced.
As it should be clear, the perception of aesthetic value in the XVI-XVIII centuries was
not necessarily the same as that of our days. Many painters who are recognized today as
great masters were not much appreciated at the time (Caravaggio being the main example),
and many acclaimed painters at the time (as Arpino, Zuccari, Liberi or Maratta) are scarsely
considered (and priced in the auction market) today. However, we have a wide documentary
evidence on the reputation of the artists in their ages. A direct account of ranking between
painters comes from Guido Reni, probably the most highly regarded (and paid) painter of the
13￿ 600s. In a letter of 1628 he wrote that three were the main categories of painters: the pittori
piø bassi (inferior painters) were at the bottom of the profession, while most of the respectable
painters were pittori ordinari, and only few, including himself, could be considered as pittori
straordinari, whose works were priceless.17 As we will see in more detail in the next section,
one can easily recognize this classi￿cation in the biographies and commentaries of the art
critics of the time for each art centre. Of course, painters￿total earnings were directly related
to their contemporary appreciation: acclaimed painters received more commissions and were
better paid for those that they could execute. Income di⁄erentials between low quality
and high quality painters were remarkable, with the ￿rst ones reaching modest earnings,
comparable to those of ordinary craftsmen, and the successful ones (almost) matching the
lifestyle of the upperclass. As a consequence, if painters were engaged in a similar range
of commissions over time, their average annual income would have been the ideal proxy for
their perceived quality (at least from the perspective of the contemporary patrons).18
3.2.2 Size of paintings
The value of art can be hardly measured in square meters. In 1587 the minor painter Giovan
Battista Armenini wrote an essay ￿On the true precepts of the art of painting￿supporting
the idea that pricing by size debases the noble art of painting and encourages artists to be
sloppy and ￿nish too rapidly their paintings. In 1667, the more famous Pietro Cortona, while
petitioning for a payment for a work in St. Peter￿ s, wrote in third person that ￿he has never
experienced that paintings are bought and sold by the palmo [size] and measurement￿(Spear
and Sohm, 2010, p. 50).
There is weak evidence that the willingness to pay of the patrons depended on the size of
17Another treatise by Giovanni Domenico Ottonelli and Pietro da Cortona of 1652, divided painters in
three similar categories: those absolutely deserving to be called excellent, those who lived without the bene￿t
of much fame and the pittori in￿mi.
18Again the most successful painter of the time give us a witty description of the relation between (his)
quality and price. When asked who was the best painter between him and the rival Guercino, Guido Reni
replies as follows: ￿I am, Fathers,..., and I could tell you the reasons in terms of art but you would not
understand them. Therefore these three simple reasons will do. First, because my pictures sell better than
his. I, in fact, taught him how to be paid well. Secondly, because he ￿shes out my ideas and tries to work the
way I do. I never followed his way of doing things. On the contrary I￿ ve always kept my distance from him.
Finally, because all the other artists follow my style and not his￿(Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 152). Reni was
aware that his stylistic innovations, the quality of his ideas and his reputation increased his prices.
14paintings. This was often constrained by a ￿xed space in the church or in another location,
and therefore it was typically exogenous. O￿ Malley (2005, Ch. 5) provides some documentary
evidence for the fact that the willingness to pay of Renaissance commissioners was mainly
dependent on elements as their own prestige and ￿honour￿rather than on objective features
of the paintings: prices were often chosen on the basis of the ￿magni￿cence￿that the patrons
wanted to signal to their community, and adeguate painters for similar prices were contacted
afterward.
On the other hand, size may have been important on the supply side: painters may have
taken size in consideration when they were bargaining on prices. If anything, one may think
that the cost of the main inputs as labor time, oil colours and help from assistants (often
paid by day), should be positively related with the size of paintings, and this should be
re￿ ected in prices. However, while costs were increasing in the size, returns to scale were not
constant: scale economies were likely to be present. A painting of any size required some
time for thinking about the composition and for working on preparatory drawings or a small
bozzetto (sketch) painting, which was justifying a less than proportional relation between
size and prices. Moreover, even if there was a tendency to ￿ll all parts of a painting with
￿gures and objects (including complex still lifes) and background decorations (either with
architectonical settings or landscapes), it is without doubt that larger altarpieces had larger
areas that required less work. For this reason, ceteris paribus, one may expect a positive but
concave relation between prices and size.
The evidence provided by O￿ Malley (2005, Ch. 6) on the prices of early altarpieces is in
favour of this but inconclusive for the limited size of the sample (and the lack of a multivariate
analysis on real prices): in the period 1450-1540 the average price of altarpieces between 2
and 4 square meters was 62 gold ￿ orins (out of 24 observations), the price between 4 an
7 square meters was 107 ￿ orins (for 22 observations), between 7 and 9 was 174 ￿ orins (for
9 observations) and between 9 an 12 it was 166 ￿ orins (two observations). The evidence
provided by Spear and Sohm (2010, pp. 240-244) on Venetian paintings in the period 1550-
1750 is more reliable for the larger number of observations, but equally inconclusive for the
lack of any control variable. They show that the average price of paintings increases with size
up to ten square meters. ￿Above 10 square meters, the numbers become erratic, dropping
by a third or more for sizes between 10 and 25 square meters. Here, mysteriously, it appears
that painters were paid less for larger paintings than for smaller ones￿ (Spear and Sohm,
2010, p. 241). Of course, these partial results are not reliable because size may be related
15with quality or with high demand commissioners, or even with other objective features, such
as the number of ￿gures. Any deeper investigation should depart from such a univariate
analysis and check how size a⁄ects prices for paintings of given features.
3.2.3 Number of ￿gures
There are not deep artistic reasons for which the counting of the human ￿gures in a painting
should a⁄ect prices, especially if time of execution and quality are already rewarded through
the size of paintings and the premium associated with the reputation of the painters. Even if
reliable conclusions are not possible with the limited data available for Renaissance, O￿ Malley
(2005, Ch. 6) does not ￿nd a positive correlation between prices and number of ￿gures (for
instance in ￿ve altarpieces of equal size painted by Neri di Bicci between 1455 and 1469).
Moreover, she uses documentary, graphic and painted evidence to show that the subject
matter of altarpieces was often discussed after signing the contracts, sometimes recorded in
separate notes (scripta) and often changed without a⁄ecting the force of the initial contracts.
In particular, ￿the number of main ￿gures planned for a work might be increased after
a contract was signed without having any impact upon the fee recorded in the notarial
agreement￿(p. 136).
At ￿rst sight, things do not seem to have changed much in the later period,19 at least in
Venice. Here, during the XVI, XVII and XVIII centuries Spear and Sohm (2010) do not ￿nd
documentary evidence of an explicit impact of the number of ￿gures on prices: ￿Of the 300
or so contracts and many more letters, diaries, etc. that have been gathered for this study,
only three (all from the ￿rst half of the sixteenth century) give a speci￿c ￿gure price￿(p.
244).20 However, prices may have been decided on the basis of the number of ￿gures even
19In a letter by Cortona cited above, the great painter criticized a positive relation between number of
￿gures and price: "Others say that the space between one ￿gure and another are a weakness, [which] shows
a lack of understanding of painting because sometimes those spaces are necessary for artistic reasons, as the
petitioner has done, and not to save labor."
20Moreover, Spear and Sohm (2010) do not emphasize any correlation between number of ￿gures and prices
in the data. They also provide stylistic explanations for this based on the traditional distinction (going back
to Vasari) between the Florentine focus on ￿gure drawing and the Venetian focus on colouring: ￿What might
be concluded from the Venetian tendency to price paintings by size rather than the number of ￿gures? It
could be taken to con￿rm an opinion that Venetian painters considered painting much more than just a
￿gural problem. What constitutes the surface or adheres to it - color and brushwork - are just as important.￿
However, once again a univariate analysis may be misleading and one should verify whether paintings with
equivalent features exibit any relation between prices and number of ￿gures.
16without stating a price per ￿gure in the contracts. Further agreements on the number of
￿gures may have been established in separate notes, letters or even verbal communications.
For instance, this happened in a rare epistolary negotiation survived until our days and
involving the Venetians painters Liberi and Zanchi (see Spear and Sohm, 2010, pp. 13-15).
Most important, pricing by number of ￿gures became a typical procedure during the early
￿ 600s in Bologna, where the leading painters Guercino and Guido Reni were able to maintain
their high fees justifying them with a high price per ￿gure. Apparently, Guercino was an
extreme (and possibily unique) example, because he claimed to commit to a ￿xed price of
100 scudi per full-lenght ￿gure (50 for half-lenght ￿gure, 25 for heads), but even this was part
of a sophisticated bargaining technique because deviations from this ￿commitment￿were the
rule rather than the exception. In a letter cited above, Reni argued that the pittori piø bassi
could not obtain more than 2 or 3 scudi for large life-size ￿gures and pittori ordinari could
ask at most 15 scudi per ￿gure, while a pittore un poco straordinario like himself could name
his own price on the basis of the quality of his work independently from size and number
of ￿gures. This was probably another selling technique, but it may have re￿ ected a way of
thinking about the relation between prices and objective features as the number of ￿gures.
From an economic point of view, there could be an incentive for the adoption of prices
increasing in the number of ￿gures. If contracts could not specify quality and moral hazard
was a relevant issue (because quality required also costly e⁄ort), an explicit or implicit con-
tract maximizing the payo⁄ of the patrons had to be based on other quanti￿able variables
correlated with quality (according to the informativeness principle by Holmstrom, 1979).
As already pointed out by Nelson and Zeckhauser (2008), the patrons￿payo⁄ could be seen
as the di⁄erence between the bene￿ts obtained with the commissions and the price paid
to the artists. The bene￿ts of the patrons were in terms of display of what they called
￿magni￿cence￿in front of the contemporary audience, of the high class elite and, in case of
altarpieces, even in front of God. In particular, for the private patrons, showing wealth and
status through these commissions was a extremely useful for business and for the political and
ecclesiastical careers (all being strongly interelated at the time), and showing devotion was
useful to conquer a place in heaven. Clearly, the signalling bene￿ts from these ostentatious
commissions were positively related to the quality of the artworks. Since this was not directly
contractable (and veri￿able), the optimal patron-artist contracts had to be based explicitly
or implicitly on any veri￿able and measurable feature of the painting that was correlated,
even poorly, with quality. In the case of historical paintings, this was possible through the
17number of human ￿gures, which was not equivalent to the absolute quality of a painting, but
was correlated with it for at least three main reasons.21
First of all, the subjects of the commissioned paintings were biblical or mythological
stories of man, women, saints, angels or mythological gods, where imagination and story-
telling had a crucial function: therefore, one could safely conclude that the variety and
complexity of the composition, summarized by the number of players, had a positive, though
partial, correlation with the ￿nal quality (this was especially true during Mannerism and the
Baroque age in which stylistic preferences were closely dictated by the horror vacui, the fear
of empty spaces in compositions).
Second, at the time there was a precise ranking in the aesthetic evaluation of subjects, with
historical compositions, portraits, landscapes and still lifes in decreasing order of appreciation:
therefore, a higher number of human ￿gures was reducing on average the space available for
subjects of lower perceived quality, as background landscapes or decorative still lifes, which
was automatically enhancing overall quality.
Third, painters were often focusing their own e⁄ort on human ￿gures and especially on
di¢ cult parts as the heads (where their own ￿hand￿was more easily recognized), delegating
less relevant parts (including background decorations, landscapes and still lifes) to their own
assistants: therefore, a higher number of ￿gures was a proxy for a wider direct intervention
of the painters in the overall execution, and consequently for higher quality.22
With the de￿nitive a¢ rmation of Renaissance painters as intellectual artists (rather than
craftmen) and pricemakers (rather than subordinated pricetakers), the relation between pa-
trons and painters changed. Once artists became more aware of thier role and power, moral
hazard problems between artists and patrons became more important, and contractual solu-
tions more relevant. For this reason, looking at paintings after the mid XVI century, ceteris
paribus, one may expect a positive relation between prices and the number of ￿gures.23
21Notice that this prediction would not apply to other genres. The market for landscapes and still lifes
was not based on commissions and buyers could look at the ￿nished paintings before bargaining. However,
portraits were on commission, and the nature of the incentive mechanisms for this case remains an open issue.
22There is another potential justi￿cation for a positive relation between number of ￿gures and quality.
Between and beside the main protagonists of each historical composition, patrons highly valued the presence
of their own portraits and those of their relatives and assistants, either in contemporary or historical costumes:
therefore, a larger number of ￿gures was often a chance to introduce precise or sketched portraits that could
please the patrons and enhance their perception of quality. However, this practice was quite common during
the early Renaissance, but became less usual in the Baroque period.
23Incidentally, the explosion of decorative putti (child angels) in the skies of Baroque paintings (see Figure
183.2.4 Placement of the paintings
An interesting element of a commission for a painting is the ￿nal position: the hierarchy
of spaces within churches and buildings may have a⁄ected prices. Looking at Venice, Spear
and Sohm (2010, p. 235) claim the presence of clear di⁄erences: ￿The chapest paintings
were placed on ceilings (13 ducats per square meter), closest to heaven but visually marginal,
followed by wall paintings (18 ducats per square meter), on average 38 percent more than
ceiling paintings. Meter-for-meter, however, altarpieces brought in the highest prices at over
twice as much as ceiling paintings (27 ducats per square mete).￿This comparison takes size
into account, but of course ignores other aspects. It may be that marginal positions were
destined to low quality painters implying lower quality and lower prices, and vice versa for
the central positions. What one should verify is whether the same painting was paid more
or less only for being destined to a di⁄erent location in the church.
From an economic point of view, one can easily realize that the demand for altarpieces
and ceilings was more rigid than the demand for wall paintings. Oil paintings were by
far the standard solution for decorating the main altars of churches and chapels, whose
number was also exogenously limited, at least in the short and medium run. Ceilings were
mostly decorated with frescoes in the rest of Italy, but not in Venice for the problems related
with humidity: therefore oil paintings became the standard solution for Venetian ceilings as
well. For the decoration of walls, however, Venetian churches and buildings had multiple
alternatives available (including statues, bronze decorations, tapestry and stucco and wood
works), which were valid substitutes. Finally, the space on walls was wider than the space on
the altar for obvious architectonical reasons. Therefore, the demand for oil paintings on walls￿
decoration was much more elastic than the demand for altarpieces and painting for ceilings.
As a consequence, ceteris paribus, one may expect a price gap between wall paintings on one
side and altarpieces and paintings for ceilings on the other side.
3.2.5 Commissioners
Besides churches, large oil paintings were bought by public authorities and wealthy pri-
vate collectors for their domestic residences. One may expect some di⁄erences between the
2 for instance) may not be unrelated with the practice of paying per ￿gure.
19demand of di⁄erent patrons, probably in size, quality and especially in subject.24 Most im-
portant, there are reason to believe that price di⁄erentials could emerge between di⁄erent
commissioners.
Public authorities, whose wealth derived from collecting taxes and printing coins (while
retaining substantial seignorage), were able to pay more for their commissions. This could
de￿nitely be the case for the commissions by the Venetian Dogi for the Palazzo Ducale or by
the Pope (who had both spiritual and temporal power at the time) for Saint Peter￿ s church.
Moreover, commissioners with larger endowments had higher willingness to pay (because of
higher bene￿ts from artworks of high quality), and were ready to give stronger incentives
to exert e⁄ort. A sort of e¢ ciency wage mechanism appears to have taken place for these
commissions, especially for the occasional altarpieces directly commissioned by the Pope.
At the same time, we can expect that the few private collectors who were able to compete
with churches and public authorities for the best painters were also able to pay more; this was
crucial because painters may have asked higher prices for paintings destined to private rooms
and not displayed in front of the public audience and appreciation (which could advertise
their work and quality and enhance their reputation).
On the other side, in the religious context of the Mannerist and Baroque age (largely
dominated by the fundamentalism of the Counter Reformation), another di⁄erence emerges
between churches and laic patrons: most painters had devotional motives for working in
churches and were often available to reduce prices for their favourite church, for poorer
churches of the new mendicant orders (as for the Franciscans and Dominicans) or for con-
fraternities. We have many examples of this (as Giovanni Bellini￿ s gift to the Scuola di
San Marco or Tintoretto￿ s gift to the Scuola di San Rocco), even if sometimes it is hard to
distinguish religious and strategic motives behind discounts.
In conclusion, ceteris paribus, one may expect a price premium for commissions from
public buildings and domestic residences of private collectors with respect to religious com-
missions.
3.2.6 Demand factors
A standard common wisdom in art history is that prices were higher in cities where demand
was higher than in small towns. In 1625, Fra Atansio, an art dealer who was negotiating
24In principle, the subjects (Old and New Testament, Saints and Martyrdoms,...) may a⁄ect prices, thought
we have no strong a priori on the direction of this correlation.
20an altarpiece by Giovanni Battista Crespi called Cerano in Milan, told the patron that the
painter would have probably accepted 250 scudi, but also that if Cerano were to go to Rome
he would be paid 500, claiming the existence of a high price di⁄erential between a large art
centre as Rome and a smaller, but not peripherical, centre as Milan (Spear and Sohm, 2010,
p. 233). Similar understanding was quite spread at the time: large cities were perceived as
paying better their commissions and Rome better than all the other cities.
O￿ Malley (2005, p.136-142) looks at a very limited dataset on Renaissance altarpieces
suggesting that prices in Florence were higher than in the rest of Central Italy and Veneto
(but lower than in Rome) in the second half of the XV century, but the relation reversed in
the ￿rst half of the XVI century. Comparisons between main art centres and countryside are
even less conclusive for the limited size of the sample and the lack of controlling factors.25
According to Spear and Sohm (2010, pp. 234-235) anecdotal evidence on the higher prices
in richer cities is con￿rmed by the data for Venice and Venetian provinces between the second
half of ￿ 500s and the beginning of ￿ 700s. Looking at average prices in this period, they ￿nd
that Bergamo priced at 360 ducats, Venice at 218, Vicenza at 148, Verona at 119 and other
minor Veneto towns at 126. Moreover, they ￿nd justi￿cations for the outliers: ￿Bergamo
places ￿rst because the deputati of S. Maria Maggiore were both wealthy and ambitious...
The bottom ranking of Verona con￿rms Scipione Ma⁄ei￿ s account in 1732 of seventeenth
century Verona as a cultural backwater.￿ Of course, these considerations must have been
relevant, but a deeper investigation of the price di⁄erentials should take into account a
number of control variables in order to verify whether Venice was paying signi￿cantly less
than Bergamo or more than Verona for comparable paintings. After all, Bergamo may have
simply commissioned larger paintings or Verona may have simply employed lower quality
painters for lower prices.
From an economic point of view, the high mobility of painters suggests that important
adjustment mechanisms could be at work when price di⁄erentials emerged between cities.
Suppose that wealthy Venetian commissioners were systematically paying more than Verona￿ s
25￿Before 1450, prices in Florence and Siena were higher than those paid in provincial towns, but in the
later ￿fteenth century the contrary was the case, and Florentine prices continued to be lower than those in
provincial towns in the early sixteenth century. Venetian painters may have had an opposite experience, that
is, between 1450 and 1500, prices may have been lower in Venice than they were on the mainland, but the
sample is very small and conclusions are tentative. After 1500, prices in Venice seem to have been higher
than those paid in the Venetian provinces￿(p. 142).
21commissioners for similar paintings. In such a case, painters from Verona should start supply-
ing their paintings only to Venice, moving there or simply sending their works there, which
would tend to reduce the average prices in Venice and increase the average prices in Verona.
The nicknames of many artists from our dataset and active in Venice immediately reveals
that, indeed, many of them moved from minor towns (especially in the late ￿ 500s): Veronese,
Massimo da Verona and Ma⁄eo Verona came from Verona, the Bassano￿ s from Bassano del
Grappa, Padovanino from Padua, and so on (including Titian who was from Pieve di Cadore,
while Tintoretto was born in Venice). On the other side, suppose that Venetian painters could
systematically earn more by exporting their altarpieces to foreign cities: then they would all
try to conquer foreign commissions (or migrate abroad, as Ricci and Pellegrini did in the
early ￿ 700s) generating an upward adjustment of the local prices. As a consequence, prices of
similar paintings should converge to the same level in Venice and Verona, as in other minor
towns and foreign locations. If price di⁄erentials between destinations remain (and we saw
above that they did), it must be that di⁄erent destinations commissioned di⁄erent paintings
(with di⁄erent size, number of ￿gures, position, type of commissioner and quality of painter).
Such a convergence process should be quite rapid in the Venetian Republic because the
mobility of painters could be regarded as almost perfect between Venice and its neighbouring
towns (and there were no tari⁄s). If we think of low quality painters whose supply was
rather elastic, price convergence should be not only rapid, but also complete. For the case of
high quality painters, whose supply can be regarded as more rigid at least in the short run
(foreign painters could be still attracted in the medium run), the convergence process could
be only marginally weaker. In conclusion, the endogeneity fo the market structure associated
with a high mobility of painters imply that, ceteris paribus, one may expect the lack of any
signi￿cant correlation between prices and destinations.
3.2.7 The plague
While local or temporary di⁄erences in demand may create adjustments through the mobility
of painters, aggregate shocks could not. During the XVII century there was a drammatic
aggregate shock to the entire North of Italy, the plague of 1630-1631, which killed a large
part of the population (another one had a similar impact on Central and Southern Italy in
1656). For instance, Venice counted 141 thousand citizens in 1624 and only 102 thousand in
1633, going back to 120 thousand in 1642 and 138 thousand only in 1696. The major impact
22of this shock was de￿nitely on the demand side. The economy was heavily hit, and spending
money on art was hardly the priority in the years after the plague: this demand shock should
have reduced the average prices. Of course, some painters died during the plague as well, but
low quality painters could always replace high quality painters for large commissions, which
may have strengthened the reduction of the prices of altarpieces even more. Therefore,
ceteris paribus, one may expect a price reduction during the decade immediately following
the plague.
3.2.8 The age of painters
The commissions for paintings of historical subject under our investigation represented the
most important segment of the market for paintings and were assigned only to artists whose
reputation and value was already established. This implies that any basic learning process for
these painters was preliminary to the entry in the market for these important commissions.
In spite of this, age could still a⁄ect the quality of paintings for a category of artists that
a celebrated book by Galenson (2006) has de￿ned as experimental innovators. These are
painters able to develop a gradual and continuous path of improvements during their career.
Typically, experimental innovators keep improving with age the quality of their work as
appreciated by experts and priced by the market (or, at least, they reach a peak at a very
advanced age). According to Galenson and Jensen (2001), leading examples of experimental
innovators have been Michelangelo, Titian and Rembrandt, but other examples of these step-
by-step innovators in Venice may have been Tintoretto and, for di⁄erent reasons, the pioneer
of the Rococ￿ renaissance, Sebastiano Ricci.
The separate category of conceptual innovators does not need much time to develop
innovations because these are pathbreaking (and often not understood and poorly priced)
changes derived from a radically di⁄erent perspective on the same artistic problems. The
thesis of Galenson is that conceptual innovators tend to reach their maximum quality at a
young age, and therefore they should not exibit a signi￿cant relation between age and quality
as priced by the market (or, at least, they should reach a peak at a very young age). Galenson
and Jensen (2001) propose the examples of Masaccio in the XV century and Raphael in the
XVI century, but the ￿rst example is problematic because Masaccio died at the age of 26,
which does not allow one to compare his young innovative activity with an older activity.
The problem is only slightly less relevant for Raphael who died at the age of 37.
23Galenson and Jensen (2001) and Galenson (2006) test what we will call the Galenson
hypothesis on auction prices for modern painters, but give up such a challenging enterprise
for the old masters given the lack of data on prices from the XV-XVII centuries. The Baroque
period provides a wider dataset for a systematic analysis of the Galenson hypothesis on old
masters. First of all, the coexistence of experimental innovators (with a positive relation
between age and innovative quality, at least up to a certain age) with conceptual innovators
and non-innovators (without such a positive relation) should preserve on average an increasing
relation between age and innovative quality. If prices were re￿ ecting quality, we may expect
also a positive correlation between age and prices after controlling for the painting and
painters￿features. Beyond such a weak test of the Galenson hypothesis, one could examine
single cases of di⁄erent kinds of innovators for a stronger support of the Galenson hypothesis.
Art history research on old master paintings has not advanced a systematic investigation
of the relation between age and artistic innovations, and even less between age and monetary
compensation in the market. Only some anecdotical evidence is available and by no means
conclusive. For instance, Spear and Sohm (2010, p. 28) limit their emphasis on the declining
prices of some painters in their older age (as for Triva and Farinati in Venice or Artemisia
Gentileschi active in Rome and Naples) due to physical decline, out of fashion style, increasing
reliance on assistants and gradual withdrawal into voluntary retirement. In the absence of
other implications from art historical studies, we will mainly focus our attention on the
weak version of the Galenson hypothesis: ceteris paribus, one may expect a positive relation
between prices and age.
4 Data and Descriptive Evidence
The data used for the empirical analysis are drawn from original commissions to painters.
The main source of the dataset is the monumental work of Spear and Sohm (2010), who have
collected data on prices (all converted in silver ducats) from original contracts and other
documentary evidence (some of which was gradually rediscovered by various art historians
in the last century) and on other characteristics of 254 oil paintings made between 1551 and
1746 by 61 artists located in Venice and in the Veneto region.26 The artists included in the
26We checked one by one the data, especially to separate multiple commissions (which required information
on size of the paintings and number of ￿gures). We also added additional data concerning the age of painters
at the time of execution and other qualitative features from standard art history sources.
24study are listed in Table 1. We can fairly look at the sample as representative of the (many
more) commissions for oil paintings that took place at the time. The main reason is that
the survival of documentary evidence on these contracts for about four centuries is largely
random. Fires, wars and other accidental events have spread losses of documents across all
the original archives. Art historians have looked at these archives for decades (usually to
search for dates and names of the artists, or to verify other contractual conditions), ￿nding
in a rather random way contracts for more or less important paintings. While their value
for art history may be di⁄erent, for our purposes the heterogenous nature of the sample is
extremely useful.
Many important informations on artworks￿characteristics that potentially in￿ uence the
price are available in the dataset. These are: title, author and size of the painting, number of
￿gures included in the composition, town and building where it was planned to be located,
position in the building (i.e. on a main or secondary altar, on the ceiling, or on lateral walls
including the organ), commissioner￿ s type, that is whether the artwork was made for a reli-
gious or for a secular commissioner (public authority or private collector), date of commission
and age of the artist when the painting was made. We also built variables indicating the
type of subject (for instance, common subjects were the Cruci￿xion, the Annunciation of the
Virgin or Moses saved from the Water), whether the painting belonged to a commission of
multiple works, the type of destination (Venice, several provincial towns, countryside desti-
nations or foreign towns) and the perceived quality of the painters, which is discussed below
in further detail.
Table 2 shows a partial list of the variables we use in the empirical analysis together with
their main summary statistics. The average price of a painting was 193.5 Venetian silver
ducats. However, a large variation in prices can be observed, with prices ranging between
a minimum of 5 to a maximum of 2,306 silver ducats. To get a clearer picture of the price
distribution in our sample, the histogram in Figure 3 illustrates the class-price distribution.
The modal price value was between 50 and 100 silver ducats, with around 27% of observations;
another 24% of the paintings were paid less than 50 silver ducats while less than 20% were
paid more than 300 ducats.
Also painting￿ s size and the number of ￿gures vary a lot across paintings: the average
painting￿ s size is 12.4 square meters but while the smallest painting in the dataset measures
0.4 square meters, the largest size is around 85 square meters. The average oil painting con-
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Figure 3: Price distribution (Venetian silver ducats)
Last Judgement. Almost half of the sample is made by artworks whose ￿nal location is lateral
wall of a church or a building, followed by altarpieces (41%) and by paintings for the ceiling
(11%).
Only 40% of Venetian artworks in our sample were for Venice. Among the other more
common destinations in the Venetian Republic we ￿nd Vicenza (8.7%), Verona (6.3%), Berg-
amo (5.1%) and Padua (4.3%). Almost one ￿fth of the paintings were addressed to minor
destinations, that is small provincial towns within the Republic (as Castelfranco Veneto,
Trevenzolo, Lentiai, Sal￿,..). Export sales were also quite common for a trading center as
the Venetian Republic: more than 13% of the paintings in our dataset were produced for
commissioners located abroad (but mostly in Italy).
As regard artists￿characteristics, the primary information collected in the dataset is their
age when the paintings were executed. From Table 2 we see that the average age at which
artworks were made in Venice was 52, spanning from a minimum of 22 to a maximum value of
81. Remarkably, a closer look at the data on painters￿age suggests that artists became more
productive after the age of 40: while only 18% of the oil paintings in our sample have been
produced by artists younger than 40, almost half of our observations refer to artworks painted
by artists in the 40-60 age range. This may re￿ ect the importance of the commissions to
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G. Salviati Francesco Bassano Loth
C. Vecellio Domenico Tintoretto Giordano
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27Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price 193,50 245,83 5 2306
Size 12,42 14,15 0,4 84,8
Nr figures 9,77 9,40 1 59
Altar 0,41 0,49 0 1
Wall 0,46 0,50 0 1
Ceiling 0,11 0,32 0 1
Venice 0,41 0,49 0 1
Minor destination 0,22 0,41 0 1
Verona/Vinceza 0,15 0,36 0 1
Bergamo 0,05 0,22 0 1
Padua 0,04 0,20 0 1
Treviso 0,03 0,17 0 1
Exports 0,13 0,34 0 1
Religious commissioner 0,75 0,43 0 1
Age 52,18 13,61 22 81
High quality 0,31 0,47 0 1
Intermediate quality 0,45 0,50 0 1
Low quality 0,23 0,43 0 1
Plague 0,02 0,14 0 1
Table 2
Summary statistics
to their masters, preparing minor works or even copying others￿paintings and only after a
few years they started receiving commissions from churches and other important patrons.
As stressed before, in principle aesthetic value should be the predominant factor of paint-
ings￿price, but it is not easy to identify quality and to measure it. Ideally, we would like
to control for artists￿￿xed e⁄ects in order to take into account of individual speci￿c char-
acteristics (namely the style) that greatly in￿ uence a painting￿ s price. However, our dataset
contains just few observations for many artists, therefore we can control for artist ￿xed e⁄ects
only when we possess su¢ cient information. This is the case for eight painters: Veronese,
Tintoretto, Palma the Younger, Farinati, Celesti, Zanchi, Ricci and Tiepolo. In order to
control for the perception of aesthetic value of the other artists, we divide them in three
categories following the above mentioned classi￿cation suggested by Reni: inferior painters
(pittori piø bassi), intermediate painters (pittori ordinari) and top quality painters (pittori
straordinari). To group the painters in these three classes of di⁄erent perceived quality, we
have followed as much as possible art historical accounts27 and documentary evidence. First
of all, in the second half of the ￿ 500s there is little doubt that three painters were (and still
are) unanimously considered as extraordinary in the terminology of Reni: Titian, Veronese
and Tintoretto. Compared to them, the contemporary Schiavone, Moroni and the members
27For a comprehensive account of Venetian art in the XVII century see Pallucchini (1981).
28of the Bassano family could be regarded as belonging to the intermediate category of ordi-
nary painters. The decadence of Venetian art of the following century was recognized since
its beginning by observers inside and outside Venice. The highly proli￿c Palma the Younger,
Domenico Tintoretto (son of Jacopo) and Padovanino were not perceived as innovators, but
only as valuable epigones of the earlier generation￿ s masters, therefore ordinary painters.
Only Liberi, the noble and rich prior of the painters￿guild, reached international (but short)
fame which was comparable (at the time) with that of the leading foreign painters.28 Col-
lectors and dealers appreciated the high standing of foreigner migrants as Loth (Spear and
Sohm, 2010, p. 231), or internationally famous painters occasionally active in Venice, as
Zuccaro or Giordano. Only at the turn of the century, a new renaissance of Venetian art was
led by Ricci, Pellegrini, Piazzetta and Tiepolo - with Canaletto active in the separate market
for vedute (views of the lagune).
Beyond this, we need to rely on some objective evidence. To build an approximate
ranking of painters that follows the perception of quality at the time (even if subject to some
uncertainty), we look ￿rst of all at the painters who were regularly enrolled in the guild Arte
dei Depentori, later transformed in the Collegio de￿Pittori: these were more likely to be
considered as valid artists in the profession. As mentioned before, ideally we would like to
have data on their average income: this can be seen as a good proxy for the demand of their
paintings and for the willingness to pay for them, which should be a monetary measure of
the average appreciation of these painters. Spear and Sohm (2010, pp. 216-218) provide data
on average tax payments of the members of the guild in three periods (1639-1644, 1684-1686
and 1717): since taxes were based on income declared in rather small communities, these
payments can be seen as reliable indicators of the average income of our painters in those
periods. Moreover, these periods are spread enough to include all the later generations of
painters and do not include any date of paintings in our dataset (which avoids any direct
dependence of the associated average incomes from our prices). Restricting the attention
to the top 20 % income earners in each of those periods, together with the high quality
painters we ￿nd Renieri, Heintz, Vecchia, Triva, Ruschi, Zanchi, Celesti, Fumiani, Dorigny,
Lazzarini, Pittoni and Trevisani. Other painters were earning much less than these or were
only occasionally active as painters (so that they could avoid enrollment): on average, one
may expect that these were regarded as lower quality painters compared to those mentioned
28Also in Rome, Liberi was cited as a ￿rst-class painter by the expert Padre Resta advising the Spada in
the selection of top painters for ￿fteen large canvases for Chiesa Nuova (Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 90).
29above. On this basis we have classi￿ed the group of ordinary painters,29 and residually the
inferior ones. According to this classi￿cation, in the Venetian art market 26 artists (43% of
the total) are classi￿ed as low-quality artists, 24 (41 %) as medium-quality artists and 11
(18%) as high-quality artists (see Table 1).
Finally, we have examined historical macroeconomic events that may have a⁄ected the
market for paintings. By far the major event was the 1630-1631 plague. We expect a
reduction in the number of traded artworks in the period following this episode as a result
of both demand and supply factors. Indeed, although our data do not represent the universe
of the works of art produced and traded on the market, the paintings produced in the two
decades immediately following the plague represent just 4.7% of our sample (less than the
average percentage for a single decade). This same fact provides indirect evidence regarding
the contraction of the art market in the period immediately following the plague. Further
evidence may emerge from the impact on prices.
5 Econometric Analysis
5.1 The price equation
The purpose of this study is to examine the process of price formation of oil paintings by old
masters in Venice in the Baroque period. Following the spirit of the hedonic price literature
(Rosen, 1974), we regress the natural logarithm of the real sale price of these paintings on a
set of paintings￿and artists￿characteristics. Our main interest is in testing the hypotheses
put forward in Section 3.
We assume that the oil paintings price formation process is captured by the following
29Movers to multiple cities as Turchi and Balestra did not appear in the lists of guild￿ s members but were
perceived as comparable to the other ordinary painters. Finally, Vecchia, Bellotti, Ricchi and Zanchi are only
occasionally added by contemporary sources as top painters in Venice (Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 90, 231
and 236), therefore it appears reasonable to consider them at least as ordinary painters. We should add that
alternative indexes only marginally a⁄ected our results, because the artist ￿xed e⁄ects remained the major
source of control for the perceived quality di⁄erences and because, as we will see, the explanatory power of
our model is already high without controlling for quality: R2 equal to 66 % against 74 % (see Table 4).
30regression equation:








￿qI(quality = q) + ￿(sale year) + ￿(plague) + "ij
The index i and j refer, respectively, to painting i and to painter j. The prices of paintings
in the dataset are expressed in Venetian silver ducats. During the entire XVII century, the
price level was surprisingly stable all over Italy, but the second half of the XVI century was
characterized by a sustained in￿ ation (due to the arrival of gold from the Americas), and the
￿rst half of the XVIII century exibited wide price variability. Therefore, we have to take into
account changes in the price level over the two centuries under consideration. To this aim,
we convert nominal prices in real terms by ￿rst converting ducats in the units of account,
the liras (according to the exchange rate of 1 ducat per 6.4 liras),30 and, secondly, by using
information regarding the quantity of Venetian liras necessary to buy a hundred kilograms of
wheat.31 Using this procedure we translate nominal prices in real terms re￿ ecting the cost of
living and its changes during the period under analysis and, thus, we base our econometric
investigation on a more reliable measure of artworks values, that is on ducats￿purchasing
power. The price variable in the above equation refers to price expressed in such real terms.
The X vector contains paintings￿characteristics, ￿rst of all the size and the number of
￿gures. Squared size and squared number of ￿gures are also considered in order to test for de-
creasing returns. Moreover, we include a set of indicator variables for the paintings￿position
(i.e. altar, ceilings or wall), for the type of commissioner (i.e. religious or secular commis-
sioner) and for the ￿nal destination, distinguishing between Venice (the excluded category),
other important Venetian Republic destinations (i.e. Verona and Vicenza, Bergamo, Padua,
and Treviso), other minor provincial destinations and exports (e.g. Turin, Milan, Genoa).
The variable AGE represents the age of artists at the time the paintings were produced.
Squared age is entered to check for concavity in the age-price pro￿le. Additional dummies
concern the eight artist ￿xed e⁄ects (￿k) and the quality indexes mentioned above (￿q). Fi-
nally, in order to take into account of changes in the Venetian art market in the period under
analysis, we insert among regressors the year in which the painting was executed (whose
30This exchange rate is constant over the entire period (Martini, 1883).
31Data on price of wheat are taken from Malanima (2002). Better in￿ation indexes are not available, but
wheat was an essential good for most of the population and its price variations were likely to be re￿ected in
those of many other goods.
31coe¢ cient ￿ represents the time trend). We ￿nally control for the plague e⁄ect by means of
a dummy variable for the decade immediately following this episode (1631-1640).
5.2 Empirical results
Table 3 shows OLS estimates of the price equation. The ￿rst remarkable thing to notice is
that the R2 is equal to 74%, pointing out a good overall ￿t and providing ￿rst evidence of the
existence of a systematic pattern in the process of price determination. Moreover, generally
the parameters take the expected sign and by and large they support our main hypotheses
on the process of oil paintings￿price determination.
Our results highlight a premium of around 9% per square meters and thus they con-
￿rm that larger paintings were paid more. Additionally, we ￿nd evidence of weak scale
economies in the production technology, as suggested by the negative and signi￿cant coe¢ -
cient of squared size.
The number of ￿gures plays a key role for price formation. More speci￿cally, each ￿gure
brings an increase in painting￿ s price of around 3%, without indications of decreasing return
to ￿gures given that the coe¢ cient of squared ￿gures in not nearly statistically signi￿cant. As
pointed out before, there can be a contractual rationale behind this result. Large oil paintings
of historical subject were complex works often taking months or years to be completed and
raised serious moral hazard issues on the e⁄ort exerted by painters in producing quality.
Given the impossibility of specifying quality (or the ￿aesthetic worth￿ ) in contracts, the
optimal patron-artist contract had to rely on measurable features that were correlated with
perceived quality, a standard principle (known as informativeness principle) in principal-agent
contract theory (Holmstrom, 1979). As argued before, the number of human ￿gures was such
a measurable feature and appears to have been extensively used in price determination.
Another factor correlated to paintings￿price was the position where they were planned to
be placed. In the estimated equation the excluded category is Altar, so that the negative and
highly statistically signi￿cant sign of the Wall coe¢ cient points out that artworks produced
for this kind of location were paid much less than altarpieces (- 61%).32 As explained in
the previous section, because of the presence of a larger number of substitutes for decoration
of lateral walls, especially in churches, the demand elasticity was higher for wall paintings
32The category Wall includes paitings for the organ section and gonfaloni, which were rare and poorly




Squared size -0.001*** (0.000)
Nr figures 0.033** (0.014)
Squared nr figures -0.000 (0.000)
Wall -0.614*** (0.108)
Ceiling 0.068 (0.171)






Religious commissioner -0.316** (0.122)
Multiple commission -0.113 (0.101)
PAINTER'S CHARACTERISTICS
Age 0.030** (0.015)

















*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3
Price equation
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: altar, destination=Venice, Secular commissioner, Low-quality
33than for both altarpieces and ceiling. This higher elasticity is likely to be the reason for this
negative premium. On the other hand, we do not ￿nd any statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence
between prices of altarpieces and ceilings, whose demand was more rigid (because of the lack
of substitute decorations and the limited space available for these artworks). Di⁄erences
between the subjects of paintings did not appear to a⁄ect prices and we did not report them,
but to some extent this is due to the correlation between certain subjects and the placement
of the paintings (an Assumption or a Cruci￿xion were typical for altarpieces, while scenes
from the lyfe of Christ or saints were typical of wall paintings).
Also the type of commissioner mattered for the price of Venetian oil paintings: our ￿ndings
highlight a price premium in case the painting was commissioned by a secular commissioner
instead of a religious one. This result may be driven by di⁄erent sources. On the demand
side, one can expect that public authorities and wealthy private collectors were able to pay
more and were also willing to pay more to induce quality and e⁄ort in their occasional
commissions (for a sort of e¢ ciency wage mechanism). On the supply side, the fact that
painters had wide visibility in case their artworks were displayed in churches rather than in a
domestic context of a private collector might imply that the artists were price discriminating
(selling their paintings at a lower price for churches because of a sort of ￿advertising e⁄ect￿
coming from artworks￿placement). Completely di⁄erent from this ￿strategic￿goal, also a
￿devotional￿motivation might have been at work when artists were willing to reduce their
prices for favourite churches or poorer religious patrons. Obviously, all these e⁄ects may have
been present at the same time.
In some cases contracts between painters and commissioners provided for multiple com-
missions, in the sense that in a single contract the parties involved in the transaction agreed
upon more than one painting and the prices for all these pieces were bargained simultane-
ously. We expected that this could produce a reduction in the unitary price because of a
￿quantity discount￿e⁄ect. However, although we ￿nd a negative coe¢ cient￿ s sign in case the
painting was part of a multiple commission, the coe¢ cient is not statistically signi￿cant at
the conventional level.
A very interesting and remarkable estimation result is that, ceteris paribus, the ￿nal des-
tination of the painting did not matter for its price determination. Hence, despite anecdotal
evidence suggesting that in large and prestigious art centres prices of art were higher than
in small provincial towns, our results seem to challenge this belief. Given the importance of
this result, we will revisit this topic in greater depth in the following section.
34Let us turn to what is probably one of the main determinant of the price of a painting,
that is its aesthetic value, and let us recall that the artist dummies and the quality-groups
we have entered in the estimation equation re￿ ect painters￿reputation as perceived by their
contemporary audience. First of all, we ￿nd that a painting produced by an artist belonging
to the highest-quality group is priced, ceteris paribus, 46% more than the comparable painting
produced by inferior painters. On the other side, the price di⁄erential between artworks by
ordinary and low quality painters is positive but not statistically signi￿cant. The artists￿
coe¢ cients highlight in some cases interesting results. Veronese and Ricci appear to have
been priced in a similar way to the other top quality painters as Titian and Piazzetta.
At the same time, Palma the Younger and Zanchi were priced in line with their ordinary
colleagues, while Celesti was paid signi￿catively less then them. Farinati was ranked as a
low quality painter, and was even paid comparatively less than his direct competitors. More
interestingly, despite their fame, Tintoretto￿ s and Tiepolo￿ s paintings were relatively low-
priced at their time. However, this should not be entirely surprising. During most of his
life, Tintoretto had to compete with great masters as Titian and Veronese, and was known
for his repeated predatory techniques: he often accepted low prices in exchange for sure
commissions. Moreover, he was particularly productive: his sketchy style allowed him to
complete numerous commissions (including the largest canvas of all times, the Paradise of
Palazzo Ducale) and an impressive amount of portraits in a relatively short time, which
made him available for lower prices than his rivals. On the other side, the prices of Tiepolo
(1696-1770) grew while he conquered an international fame for his fresco decorations around
Europe: our dataset ends in 1750 and therefore collects only his early paintings and not the
late phase of his career (and none of the frescoes), therefore it is not surprising that the prices
of his early paintings (mostly altarpieces) were relatively low.
Considering now the age of execution of paintings, our results suggest that the artists in
our dataset were, at least partially, ￿experimental innovators￿ , that is painters who, thank
to a gradual development of their artistic ability, were able to improve their capability to
produce high aesthetic-value artworks with the progress of their career. As a matter of
fact, the coe¢ cient for age of painter is statistically signi￿cant and it denotes an average
increase in the price of paintings by around 3% a year. In Section 6 we will present some
additional evidence on the role of age in the case of some speci￿c signi￿cant painters present
in the dataset (Tintoretto and Ricci for Venice) in order to see how the Galenson hypothesis
relative to the age-quality pro￿le was at work during the Baroque era.
35Finally, the positive and highly signi￿cant coe¢ cient of the date variable highlights an
increase in paintings￿prices by an average of 0.5% for year (mainly due to price increases in
the early XVIII century).
5.3 Destination e⁄ects: endogenous market forces at work
In the previous section we found that, once controlling for painting￿ s and painter￿ s char-
acteristics, there is no price di⁄erential between artworks placed in di⁄erent geographical
locations. This result goes opposite to the standard perception cited in Section 3 that art
prices were higher in large and high-status cities than in smaller provincial centres, but in
line with our theoretical predictions on market adjustments due to the mobility of painters.
In this section we investigate further on this point in order to highlight which are the factors
driving the vanishing of the destination e⁄ect. Table 4 presents destinations￿parameters
resulting from three di⁄erent price equations speci￿ed following a stepwise procedure. In all
three speci￿cations we enter a set of dummy variables for the main destinations (Verona and
Vicenza, Bergamo, Padua, and Treviso) and a dummy variable for the other minor provin-
cial destinations of the Venetian republic. Moreover, we enter a dummy for exports, that is,
destinations outside the Venetian republic (e.g. Turin, Milan, Genoa, Madrid). Venice is the
reference group.
In column 1 coe¢ cients result from estimation of the most parsimonious price equation
containing only the dummies for destination and size of paintings. As it is clear from the table,
we ￿nd that on average paintings addressed to Verona and Vicenza and to small provincial
centres were considerably less valued than paintings produced for Venice, even controlling for
size (- 34% for Verona and Vicenza and - 29% for minor towns). On the contrary, we detect
a positive premium for export sales, as witnessed by the positive and signi￿cant sign of the
coe¢ cient of the dummy for exports (+ 53%). For the other main towns of the Republic,
that is Bergamo, Treviso and Padua, we do not ￿nd a di⁄erential in prices per square meter
with respect to Venice. In particular, as mentioned earlier, Bergamo did exibit total prices
that were much higher than in Venice, but simply controlling for the size of paintings, the
di⁄erence looses its signi￿cance.
So far it has emerged that actually there were towns less priced than Venice and that
paintings made for exports were more rewarded than paintings produced for Venice. However,
these results have been obtained without controlling for either paintings￿characteristics or
36Independent variables
PAINTINGS' CHARACTERISTICS
Size 0.034*** (0.004) 0.098*** (0.010) 0.088*** (0.010)
Squared size -0.001*** (0.000) -0.001*** (0.000)
Nr figures 0.040*** (0.015) 0.033** (0.014)
Squared nr figures -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
Wall -0.819*** (0.110) -0.614*** (0.108)
Ceiling -0.075 (0.176) 0.068 (0.171)
Minor destination -0.287* (0.164) -0.252** (0.124) -0.077 (0.129)
Verona/Vinceza -0.337* (0.185) -0.315** (0.140) -0.127 (0.148)
Bergamo 0.277 (0.286) 0.052 (0.206) 0.027 (0.199)
Padua 0.441 (0.309) 0.263 (0.218) 0.194 (0.207)
Treviso -0.289 (0.395) -0.235 (0.279) -0.191 (0.278)
Exports 0.525** (0.216) 0.205 (0.156) 0.171 (0.154)
Religious commissioner -0.457*** (0.117) -0.316** (0.122)
Multiple commission 0.046 (0.103) -0.113 (0.101)
PAINTER'S CHARACTERISTICS
Age 0.030** (0.015)









Palma il Giovane 0.199 (0.168)
Zanchi 0.146 (0.184)
OTHER
Date 0.007*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001)
Plague -0.719** (0.312) -0.810*** (0.293)
Constant -0.813*** (0.116) -11.996*** (1.195) -10.404*** (1.771)
Observations 254 254 254
R-squared 0.247 0.666 0.741
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: altar, destination=Venice, Secular commissioner, Low-quality




37for those of the painters. In order to see what is the role of di⁄erences between features of
paintings addressed to di⁄erent destinations, in column 2 of Table 4 we show destinations￿
dummies coe¢ cients obtained after controlling for the attributes of the artworks (remarkably,
these allow us to explain two thirds of price variability). What we ￿nd is that the negative
price di⁄erentials registered for minor centres and for Verona and Vicenza remain but they
are reduced in size. Most important, the export premium vanishes: the coe¢ cient for foreign
destinations decreases a lot and it loses completely its statistical signi￿cance. This result
suggests that paintings with similar characteristics were paid abroad the same as in Venice,
while the price di⁄erential detected before was simply due to the fact that exported paintings
possessed more characteristics that were more valued by the market than those produced for
Venice.
Finally, if we consider the high mobility of painters that characterized the Venetian market
for art in the period under analysis, we expect that after controlling for painters￿character-
istics any price di⁄erential disappears. In e⁄ect, results in column 3 of Table 4 show that
destinations￿coe¢ cients obtained from estimation of the fully speci￿ed equation are not at
all statistically signi￿cant. The comparison of results in columns 2 and 3 reveals that minor
centres￿paintings were paid less because they were produced by lower quality painters, so
that when controlling for painters￿quality the di⁄erential disappears.
Our result is consistent with the hypothesis that the structure of this market was en-
dogenous and painters￿mobility was arbitraging away price di⁄erentials between towns with
di⁄erent demand. In a dynamic perspective, any price di⁄erential should induce painters to
move toward high price towns (or send their works there), which would tend to put downward
pressure on the prices of those towns and to increase the prices of the other towns.
On the other hand, aggregate shocks a⁄ecting demand in all the towns could a⁄ect equilib-
rium prices everywhere. We con￿rm this result with the dummy for the decade following the
1630 plague, which shows a drastic and signi￿cant reduction in the average prices (- 81 %).
In conclusion, aggregate shocks a⁄ected prices, but local shocks tended to generate market
adjustments (namely movements of painters or paintings) which avoided price di⁄erentials.
6 A Look at Rome, Florence, Bologna and Naples
The aim of this section is to check for the robustness of our ￿ndings by testing whether the
main results obtained for the Venetian art market hold also for the other leading Italian art
38Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Price 320.55 394.64 326.20 329.11 201.94 127.57 412.75 641.27 258.13 357.15
Size 8.95 7.08 9.06 8.10 6.90 2.20 10.39 6.55 7.99 4.21
Nr figures 6.44 3.74 5.95 3.55 6.28 2.97 7.23 5.04 7.53 2.85
Age 43.93 12.70 43.34 13.52 47.83 11.92 43.53 13.17 44.71 8.79
High quality 0.29 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.11 0.32 0.50 0.51 0.29 0.46
Intermediate quality 0.41 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.89 0.32 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.50
Low quality 0.29 0.45 0.37 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.36 0.26 0.45
Rome 0.60 0.49  -  -  -  -
Florence 0.07 0.26  -  -  -  -
Bologna 0.17 0.37  -  -  -  -
Naples 0.16 0.37  -  -  -  -
Plague 0.10 0.29 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.49
Observations 241 145 18 40 38
Table 5
Summary statistics - Italy
All Rome Florence Bologna Naples
centres, that is Rome, Florence, Bologna and Naples. Also in this case the source of data
is Spear and Sohm (2010), from which we derive information on the original sale prices and
on other characteristics of 241 artworks traded in these towns during the Baroque period
and produced by 93 artists.33 During 2010, the same source will reveal (through an online
database administered by the Getty Research Institute) a more complete dataset with a
thousand Roman paintings which will provide a chance for further validation of our and
other results.
Here, we conduct a distinct empirical analysis for the four mentioned towns because the
period to which their data refer is much narrower than in the case of Venice (we observe
prices of paintings bargained only in the XVII century and, in Rome, from 1583 to 1700)
and because we have a more limited set of explanatory variables.34 Di⁄erently from the
33To give a ￿avour of the most famous artists in the dataset, this includes late Mannerists (as Barocci and
Arpino), Caravaggio and the so-called Caravaggists (as Honthorst, Vouet, Gentileschi, Caracciolo, Ribera,
Preti), the leading Bolognese classicists (as Annibale and Ludovico Carracci, Domenichino, Albani, Guercino
and Reni), the leading painters of the Roman Baroque (as Pietro da Cortona, Sacchi, Maratta and Gaulli), few
painters mainly active in Florence (as Rosselli and Ferri), few others mainly active in Naples (as Lanfranco,
Stanzione and Giordano) and many more.
34We excluded frescoes. Also in this case we checked one by one all the observations, correcting few size
measures (occasionally mixing inches with centimeters) and collecting the data for the number of ￿gures in
paintings from Rome by visual inspection of the original paintings. In a few cases in which this was not
possible we estimated the number of ￿gures on the basis of the subject and size to avoid possible selection
bias.
39Venice dataset, in the case of Rome, Florence, Bologna and Naples the data do not provide
information relative to the planned position (altar, ceiling or wall). Finally, the paintings in
the dataset refer exclusively to bargaining between artists and religious commissioners (there
are no public and private patrons).
The prices of paintings are expressed in the local contemporary currencies. More speci￿-
cally, for Rome and Florence they are expressed in their own silver scudi, for Bologna in liras,
which can be immediately converted in its silver scudi, and for Naples in silver ducats. All
these silver coins were exchanged almost at parity between each other, and, most important
for our purposes, without increasing deviations over time.35 During the XVII century in￿ a-
tionary phenomena were virtually absent in Italy,36 therefore we do not have the necessity
of correcting prices for the cost of life (whose measure is also hardly available in comparable
ways for the four cities under investigation). Nevertheless, we introduce dummies for prices
in the currencies of the four cities and a time trend to control for residual di⁄erences between
average prices in di⁄erent cities and for in￿ ationary trends.
Table 6 shows some key features of the whole sample and by town. First of all, notice
that 60 % of the paintings were from Rome, which was indeed the leading art center of
the continent. On average, prices were higher in Bologna and lower in Florence. However,
while the paintings of the former town have both size and number of ￿gures higher than
the national average, for the latter the opposite is true. The oil paintings produced in our
four cities were slightly smaller than in Venice (9 square meters instead of 12.4) and with
less ￿gures (6.4 instead of 9.7). Interestingly, the mean age of painters was very similar
between the four towns, ranging from 43.3 (for Rome) to 47.8 (for Florence). The mean age
of Venetian painters was instead higher (52 years old).
35The quantity of silver in the di⁄erent coins were occasionally changed (not in Rome and Florence during
this period). However di⁄erences in the exchange rate were minimal for at least two reasons. First, the value
of each silver coin was a matter of prestige for each town and was accurately defended. Second, when an
exchange rate between silver coins was deviating from nominal parity, less valuable coins were systematically
fused, leading authorities to adjustments to avoid this. The largest di⁄erence was between the Neapolitan
ducat and the Roman scudo (but the cost of life was correspondingly lower in Naples). Nevertheless, even in
this case, we have direct evidence of painters (as Artemisia Gentileschi) who were indi⁄erent between being
paid the same number of Roman scudi or Napolitan ducats (Spear and Sohm, 2010).
36To give a couple of examples from Rome, where the scudo was divided in 100 baiocchi, the price per
12-oz. pound of cow￿ s milk cheese was 7 baiocchi in 1595 and 7.5 in1701; the price of sausages was 10 baiocchi





Squared size -0.001** (0.001)
Nr figures 0.163*** (0.041)
Squared nr figures -0.005** (0.002)





Saint Peter's altarpieces 0.596*** (0.151)
Minor destination 0.152 (0.114)
PAINTER'S CHARACTERISTICS
Age 0.050** (0.022)
















*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 6
Price equation - Rome, Florence, Bologna and Naples
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Reference categories: subject?Christ, destination=Rome, Low-quality
41Turning to the price equation, our main explanatory variables are the same as before,
including the size of paintings, the number of ￿gures and their squared levels. Since we do
not have systematic information on the positioning of the paintings (altar, wall, ceiling), we
carefully build dummies for the subjects of the paintings (including those for the presence of
Christ or the Virgin in the composition, Old versus New Testament stories, and so on), which
were often depending on the placement of the painting in the churches. Moreover, we can
classify a particular category of altarpieces, the few altarpieces that were commissioned by
the Pope for the decoration of the Saint Peter￿ s church. This was the centre of Christendom
and the place where pilgrims from all over the Christian world went. We expect to see
a remarkable price premium for altarpieces addressed to this church because of the general
premium for altarpieces and of the unique wealth of the commissioner (with a high willingness
to pay artists in order to provide unmatchable incentives to produce high quality). We test
this hypothesis by including a dummy variable for Saint Peter￿ s altarpieces. As we did for
the Venetian art market, also in this case we used dummies for seven artists with enough
observations (Caravaggio, Cortona, Domenichino, Reni, Maratta, Tiarini and Preti) and
divided painters in three groups according to their reputation as perceived at the time, again
on the basis of documentary evidence from contemporary sources (details available from the
authors).
To verify the impact of di⁄erent destinations on the price of paintings, we relied on a
conservative test. We have built a dummy variable, Minor destination, which includes all the
smallest destinations di⁄erent from the four main towns and the other leading art centers (as
Genoa or foreign cities which had high demand). We have experimented di⁄erent de￿nitions,
including only small towns in the countryside as for instance Caprarola, Palestrina, Nola,
Volterra, Spoleto and so on, or even larger provincial towns as Ancona, Lucca or Perugia
(all together representing 25 % of the observations). If none of these de￿nitions of minor
destinations exibits lower prices than the main cities (after controlling for paintings￿and
painters￿features), we can safely support the thesis for which market forces led to price
equalization.
Finally, we checked for a time trend and for a macroeconomic shock identical to the one
evaluated in the analysis of Venice. The plague of 1630 did not reach the towns below the
Appenini. However, another plague hit Rome, Florence and Naples in 1656. As before,
we checked for this aggregate demand shock by means of a dummy variable for the decade
immediately following the plague (1656-1665) in these three cities.
42Estimation results are in Table 6 and they largely con￿rm the pattern of price determina-
tion detected for Venice. Also in this case, the high value of the R2 (66 %) points out a good
overall ￿t of the model. First of all, the value of paintings continues to be strongly related
to their objective feature: the return to size is identical to what we found for Venice (around
8 % per square meter) and again we ￿nd decreasing returns to size.
The number of ￿gures is still positively related to price but its coe¢ cient is much larger
than for Venice: in that case we found that prices on average increased by 3 % per ￿gure, while
now we ￿nd that each ￿gure brings a growth in price of around 15%. However, di⁄erently from
Venice the negative and signi￿cant sign of the squared number of ￿gures suggests concavity.
Therefore we con￿rm the evidence for a contractual solution to the moral hazard problem
between patrons and artists through prices depending on the number of ￿gures. The higher
marginal impact of the number of ￿gures is consistent with the stronger evidence of pricing
per ￿gure between Bolognese artists as Guercino, Reni and Domenichino, all of whom spread
their stylistic and contractual in￿ uence in both Rome and Naples. The more widespread
adoption of pricing per ￿gure in Central and South Italy is likely to explain the larger impact
(on average) of the number of ￿gures.
While subjects did not a⁄ect prices in our analysis of Venice, in the case of the rest of
Italy we found that when the subject of the artwork included Christ the painting was paid
24 % more (other subject variables were not signi￿cant). This result may depend on the
correlation between this particular subject and the position of the painting in the church
(for which we cannot control here): the presence of Christ in a painting was more typical
of paintings positioned on the altar (Cruci￿xion; Nativity: Virgin, Child and Saints, and so
on), and for Venice we found that altarpieces were indeed paid more. While we do not have
paintings for private or public buildings, our dataset includes few altarpieces destined to Saint
Peter￿ s church, which was the main display of the magni￿cence of the Pope, the secular and
temporal head of Rome: not surprisingly, prices for these altarpieces were much more paid
than average (+ 59 %). The fact that the painting was part of a multiple commission does
not a⁄ect prices: similarly to what we found for Venice, the coe¢ cient is negative but not
statistically signi￿cant, suggesting that a quantity discount practice was not systematically
at work in this market.
Again, quality played a decisive role in price determination: high-quality and intermediate-
quality artists were paid on average respectively 70 % and 38 % more than low-quality
painters. None of the artists￿￿xed e⁄ect coe¢ cient is statistically signi￿cant, meaning that
43these artist were not paid di⁄erently from the painters of the group they belonged to (the
top quality one for Cortona, Domenichino, Reni e Maratta, the intermediate quality one for
Caravaggio, Tiarini and Preti).
Let us turn to the relationship between destination in di⁄erent towns. First of all, one
should keep in mind the caveat that here the dummies for the provenance from the four
towns (Florence, Naples and Bologna relative to the omitted Rome) re￿ ect di⁄erences in
exchange rates between silver coins jointly with additional di⁄erences between average prices
(and these di⁄erences are not signi￿cant, with the exception of Bologna). Given this, we
are interested in evaluating price di⁄erentials between paintings destined to the high-demand
cities and the minor destinations. The corresponding dummy Minor destination never had a
negative coe¢ cient, with the wider de￿nition employed here and even when we included more
restrictive de￿nitions of minor destinations (and the coe¢ cient always remained positive).
This suggests that, after controlling for paintings￿and painters￿features, prices were not
higher in Rome and the other main cities compared to the countryside and minor towns. We
see this result as a strong support of our general hypothesis for which the mobility of painters,
in this case mainly toward Rome, was eliminating price di⁄erentials in the Italian market for
paintings. Once again, prices were indeed higher in Rome, but only because better painters
went there and more ambitious commissions were available there: in equilibrium, painters of
similar quality were paid the same everywhere for the same commissions.
Finally, we need to verify whether a macroeconomic shock a⁄ects prices in a predicted
way. As before, we ￿nd that the decade immediately following the plague in Rome, Florence
and Naples (1656-1665) was characterized by a strong reduction in the prices of art for these
three cities (- 39%).
Overall, the results obtained by estimating our price equation for the other major Italian
art centres are substantially identical, at least qualitatively, to those we found for Venice.
Accordingly, we are con￿dent that our analysis has described properly the process of price
formation on the Italian market for paintings of the Baroque period.
6.1 The Galenson hypothesis
The positive relation between age of painters and price of paintings previously ascertained for
Venice is even more robust for the other Italian towns, as suggested by the larger and equally
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Figure 4: Age-price pro￿le for selected top quality painters
other towns considered included many (possibly more than Venice) experimental innovators in
the Galenson￿ s terminology, that is artists able to develop their skills to produce high-quality
works through experience. This is also supported by the fact (not detailed in the table)
that high and medium quality painters drive the mentioned relation between age and price
(actually, age is not signi￿cant for the subset of low quality painters, while its coe¢ cient is
maximal for the subset of high quality painters). Figure 4 reports the life cycle of the price per
square meter for some famous and high-quality painters of di⁄erent generations:37 Tintoretto
and Ricci from Venice and Reni and Domenichino who were active mainly in Bologna and
Rome. For all of them a discernible increasing path of the normalized price of paintings is
clearly visible. Most interestingly, all of them could be seen as belonging to the category of
experimental painters in the Galenson￿ s terminology. Leaving additional investigations for
art historical research, we should add at least a few remarks on the careers of these painters.
Tintoretto developed his style during the second half of the XVI century in competition
with the older Titian, and his sketchy technique gave him an impressionistic device to create
37Similar patterns emerge also with absolute prices, but a normalization by size provides a more reliable
measure of the pricing of the painters.
45powerful theatrical images throughout his entire career, until the last year of his life in which,
76 years old, he completed one of his masterpieces, the Last Supper (S. Giorgio Maggiore,
Venice).
Ricci is de￿nitely less famous than the leading Venetian painter of the XVIII century
(Tiepolo), but was the real starter of the Venetian renaissance in the Rococ￿ period (after a
century of artistic provincialism), traveling across all Europe and absorbing and rielaborating
the most advanced international experiences of his time. One of the leading experts of
Venetian art (Pallucchini, 1981) talks about a ￿slow development￿(sviluppo lento) of Ricci￿ s
style. The majority of his works, and all the most famous ones are posterior to 1700 (when
he was more than forty), which clearly points toward experimentalism.38
Finally, also the two leading Bolognese painters, Reni and Domenichino, experienced a
deep and long evolution toward an ideal classicism which led them to increasing fame and
appreciation. Reni reached his maturity when back in Bologna after more than a decade
spent in Rome (and the initial apprenticeship in Bologna). His own words may be the best
witnesses of his constant experimentalism: ￿the most beautiful painting is the one I am doing,
and if tomorrow I will do another, it will be that one.￿ 39 Also Domenichino improved his style
in a long activity in Rome, but he reached his maximum achievements in the last decade of
his life, almost entirely dedicated to the frescoes for the Cathedral of Naples (not included
in our dataset but associated with the unparalleled payment of more than 20,000 ducats).40
Caravaggio followed a completely di⁄erent path throughout his career. He moved from
Milan to Rome without much experience, and rather than learning the mannerist style of his
initial master Arpino (celebrated and well paid at the time, virtually forgotten today), he
approached painting from a new and di⁄erent perspective. Caravaggio was revolutionary in
many ways: introducing (and giving unprecedented dignity to) new subjects as still lifes and
genre paintings, adopting a new way to bring external light into the pictures, and pursuing
extreme realism beyond anyone had ever done. All of these innovations emerged immediately
in the early works during his twenties, as in the famous Basket of Fruits and the Fortune
38His last and best paid work was an imperial commission from Charles VI for an Assumption (Vienna,
Karlskirche, 1733-1734). Ricci died before receiving the agreed 6000 ￿orins, and therefore this painting does
not belong to our dataset. See L￿ Opera Completa di Sebastiano Ricci (1976, Daniels, J. Ed, Milan: Rizzoli).
39Our own translation from Italian: ￿il quadro piø bello Ł quello che sto facendo, e se domani uno ne far￿
sar￿ quello￿. See L￿ Opera Completa di Guido Reni (1971, Garboli, C. Ed, Milan: Rizzoli)
40Apparently, the success of this last works created so much envy that some Neapolitan painters killed
Domenichino poisoning his food (Spear and Sohm, 2010, p. 121-123).
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Figure 6: Age-price pro￿le for a conceptual innovator
Teller, executed when about 24, or in altarpieces as The Calling of St. Metthew (see Figure
5), executed at the age of 28. His later works are considered equally valuable, but less
innovative. Even looking at Caravaggio￿ s compensations we do not ￿nd any increasing pattern
with age. Besides being poorly priced from the beginning (but in line with ordinary painters),
Caravaggio was not perceived as improving his quality or innovating during his career. Figure
6 shows the price per square meter of his altarpieces included in our dataset: the erratic path
is in line with the hypothesis that we are in front of a conceptual innovator in the terminology
of Galenson (2006).
6.2 Endogenous entry of painters
Drawing our conclusions on the comparison between the main Italian art centres, we point
out few suggestions for future research emerging from our analysis of the endogenous entry
of painters in the art market.
As for any occupational choice, the choice to become a painter required some talent and
a long training, but was largely determined by economic motivations, namely by its expected
pro￿tability. The same could be said for the decision to specialize in historical paintings or
portraits or still lifes, and to be based in a big city or in a smaller provincial town. We found
indirect evidence that market forces were at work in determining these entry decisions when
we emphasized a tendency toward price equalization between high-demand and low-demand
48towns. Beyond this, it would be interesting to investigate how actual entry in the art market
was a⁄ected by di⁄erences in demand between towns and by aggregate shocks.
Unfortunately, the data on the number of painters are highly unreliable and not available
for all the cities and over time, also because little is known about many less famous artists
active in the markets for portraits or still lifes. Therefore, we can only have a preliminary
look at some estimates of the number of painters by Spear and Sohm (2010). They estimate
that 190 painters were active in Rome in 1634 and 200 after the plague in 1665, which
corresponds to 0,20 % of the population. We do not have good insights on the number
of painters in Venice at the beginning of the XVII century, but after the plague in 1633,
about 80 painters were active in Venice, growing to 180 at the end of the century (0,13 %
of the population). Smaller numbers and, smaller percentages of the population have been
estimated in minor towns of the Venetian Republic as Brescia (0,10 %) and Verona (0,07 %).
Florence, which was much smaller and in clear decline relative to the Renaissance period,
counted 68 painters in 1632, corresponding to 0,10 % of the population. Finally, the highest
number of non-Italian painters was by far active in Rome, followed by Venice. All this is
broadly in line with an endogenous entry process in the market for paintings, but further
investigations in this direction would be useful.
Endogenous entry phenomena raise a deeper question, which we can only leave for fu-
ture research: did pro￿tability a⁄ect not only the number of painters, but also their search
for innovation, productivity and quality? If this was the case, one could see some reverse
causality: while in the short run painters￿quality determines their pro￿tability, in the long
run pro￿tability contributes to determine quality. More importantly from a cultural point
of view, if prices and pro￿ts were indeed a source of artistic innovation, then one of the
derminants of the path of art history may have been the endogenous structure of the art
market. As the mannerist painter Vasari wrote in his ￿Lives of the Most Excellent Painters,
Sculptors, and Architects￿(1568), ￿if in our century there were enough pro￿ts [for painters],
we would paint greater and better works than the older masters.￿ 41
41Our own translation from Italian: ￿se in questo nostro secolo fusse la giusta remunerazione, si farebbono
senza dubbio cose piø grandi e molto migliori che non fecero mai gli antichi￿. Incidentally, Vasari was the
￿rst art historian to mention ￿competition￿as one of the sources of Florentine leadership in Renaissance art.
497 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the market for important commissions for oil paintings of
historical subject during the Baroque era through econometric analysis of the prices derived
from original sale contracts. Our main purpose was to show that looking at the market for
paintings as a fully ￿ edged market and analyzing the contractual aspects of its deals and the
endogeneity of its structure could shed light on the mechanism of price determination.
The market for oil paintings was extremely competitive and populated by players very
similar to what we may now de￿ne as representatives of the homo economicus. They devel-
oped forms of horizontal and vertical di⁄erentiation which created separate markets where
demand and supply conditions clearly a⁄ected equilibrium prices. They solved contractual
problems between patrons (principals) and artists (agents) as we would expect in the pres-
ence of unveri￿able quality and moral hazard issues: conditioning payments on measurable
variables related to quality, as the number of ￿gures depicted. They migrated between art
markets trying to exploit opportunities for extra pro￿ts, to the point of eliminating any price
di⁄erentials in equilibrium. And they exploited their experience to innovate and increase
their market power.
In a celebrated historical account of the demand for art in the Renaissance period, Goldth-
waite (1993) has pointed out that Italian cities have generated the ￿rst modern markets for
durable luxury goods, which have been at the origins of modern capitalism based on ￿con-
sumerism￿ .42 ￿Today the consumer instinct is taken for granted: the challenge to producers
is to introduce new products, reduce prices, and change fashion... If, on the one hand, we
decry what this consumerism has developed into in our own times, with its commodity cul-
ture of planned obsolescence, throwaway goods, and fashion-ridden boutiques, on the other
hand we have enshrined its very spirit in our great museums. These veritable temples to
the consumption habits of the past, where we worship as art one of the dynamics that gives
life to the economic system of the West, mark the supreme achievement of capitalism￿(pp.
253-254).
The market for paintings in the XVI-XVIII century is not only one of the ￿rst markets for
durable luxury goods of the modern capitalistic society. Its surviving documentary evidence
and even its surviving products are witnesses that it was also one of the ￿rst markets to
42Incidentally, a key part of the industrial structure of the main Italian urban centres is still based on the
production and export of durable luxury goods.
50follow the main laws of economics.
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